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PENNSYLVANIA v. MIMMS: CONTINUED
EROSION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
SAFEGUARDS
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees to individuals freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the federal government.' This guarantee has
been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 2 One of the applications of the fourth amendment
3
has been the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at trial.
This "exclusionary rule" limits the power of police to search for
and seize evidence. Since the role of police in society has increasingly become important with the continued rise of crime in
our cities, effective law enforcement cannot be achieved unless
the police possess some degree of authority to investigate criminal activity. One method used by police when investigating suspicious activity is the procedure known as stop and frisk. 4 This
procedure involves a brief detention of a citizen for questioning
and a limited search, usually initiated on less than probable
cause.
The police practice of stop and frisk was officially recognized by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio5 as being within
the "purview" of the fourth amendment. 6 In Terry the Court acknowledged that a valid stop and frisk is an exception to the
warrant requirement contained in the fourth amendment.7 The
Court employed a dual inquiry test 8 to determine that the stop
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

2. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourteenth amendment made applicable to the state courts).
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusionary rule first

established in federal courts).
4. The police practice of stop and frisk is a procedure whereby officers
detain suspicious citizens for questioning and, occasionally, a limited
search is conducted. The initial stop is usually initiated on less than probable grounds. This law enforcement technique has been a matter of routine
in every major police department in the country for many years. See
generally LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters and Beyond, 67 MIcH. L.REv. 40, 42-43 (1968); Comment, Stop and
Frisk, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 837 (1969).
5. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

6. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
7. Id. at 20, 30.

8. Id. at 20.
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and frisk procedure met the requirement of reasonableness contained in the fourth amendment. First, the Court focused on
9
whether the officer's action was justified from the start; secondly, the Court inquired whether the police action "was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
interference in the first place."' 1 Thus, the Court in Terry established that a frisk would be reasonable when the officer could
infer from the circumstances that "criminal activity may be
afoot" and that his safety was endangered."
In the aftermath of Terry, the Supreme Court encountered a
number of cases involving the permissible scope of a stop and
frisk. 12 The outcome from these cases was that the reasonableness requirement in Terry was extended from reliance on the
police officer's own observations to reliance on an unverified informant's tip. 13 Consistent with this trend, the Court has turned
away from a case-by-case analysis in determining the reasonableness of a police officer's action to a broad expansion of the
14
The
warrantless search exception of the fourth amendment.
Court in subsequent cases has rationalized this intrusion upon
the citizen's right to privacy by pointing to the need of law enadded security in their day-to-day enforcement officials to have
15
counters with citizens.
Against this background the Supreme Court recently
decided Pennsylvania v. Mimms.16 The Court in Mimms held
that the fourth amendment is not violated when a police officer
orders a citizen out of his car for the purpose of issuing a traffic
summons. Such action is reasonable under the fourth amendment because of the possible danger a police officer exposes
himself to when he stops a citizen to issue a traffic summons.
The significance of Mimms is threefold: first, the Court departed
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See 392 U.S. at 30.
12. E.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Sibron v.

New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Both
Peters and Sibron were companion cases to Terry, and were disposed of in

the same opinion.
13. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
14. See Note, The Supreme Court Gives the Green Light to Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 974 (1974); Note, United States v.
Robinson: Toward a Neutered Principleof the ExclusionaryRule, 8 U.S.F.L.
REV. 777 (1974); Note, Personal Search of Suspect Incident to CustodialArrest is Per Se "Reasonable"and Requires no Additional Justification, 49
WASH. L. REV. 1123 (1974).
15. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); accord, note 12 supra.

16. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).

19781

Pennsylvania v. Mimms

from its prior holding of evaluating fourth amendment issues according to an individualized inquiry into the particular circumstances; second, the Mimms decision reiterates the Court's
profound concern for police safety; and third, the Court now
holds that once a police officer lawfully stops a citizen to issue a
traffic summons, the additional intrusion of ordering the citizen
out of his vehicle is inconsequential.
Prior to Mimms the question presented to the Court in deciding whether a police officer's intrusion into a citizen's privacy
was violative of the fourth amendment, was to view the particular circumstances in each case and to ascertain according to the
rationale enunciated in Terry whether the facts would indicate
to a reasonable officer that "criminal activity might be afoot" or
that his safety was endangered. 17 In Mimms, however, the
Court addressed the question of whether or not an objective test
should be applied where there are no observable facts present
indicating criminal activity or threatening the officer's safety.
PENNSYLVANIA V. MiMMs -

THE CASE

Facts
Two police officers observed Mimms driving an automobile
with an expired license plate. The officer stopped the vehicle for
the purpose of issuing a traffic summons. It was the officer's
common practice that when approaching vehicles, he would order all drivers out of their cars. Accordingly, the officer asked
Mimms to step out of his car and produce his operator's license.
When Mimms alighted from the car, the officer noticed a large
bulge under Mimms's jacket. Fearing that the bulge might be a
weapon, the officer immediately frisked Mimms and discovered
a loaded revolver in his waistband. Thereupon Mimms was arrested, indicted, and subsequently convicted for carrying a concealed weapon.
A motion to suppress the weapon on fourth amendment
grounds was denied by the trial court. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted allocatur. 18
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower
court's decision and held that the policy of ordering all drivers
17. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
18. Allocatur is a latin term meaning it is allowed. It was formally used

to show that an order or writ was allowed. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 100
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).

210

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:207

stopped for traffic violations out of their vehicles violated the
fourth amendment unless the officer's objective appraisal would
indicate that the motorist was potentially dangerous. 19 The
Pennsylvania Court relied on Terry as a basis for their reversal.
The court noted that the Terry decision authorizing a stop and
frisk was limited to situations where "a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude .. .
that criminal activity may be afoot." The unusual conduct observed by the police officer in Terry involved two men who
walked past the same store window and peered in approximately twenty-four times. These two men then walked to a
nearby street corner and began conferring with a third man.
The police officer suspected that the men had been "casing" the
store, and only after these personal observations, did the police
officer take steps that led to the stop and frisk.
Recognizing the narrow holding of Terry, the Pennsylvania
court held that the stop and frisk of Mimms "was not initiated
on the basis of an objective appraisal of the given circumstances
but rather on a policy of ordering all drivers stopped for traffic
violations out of their vehicles." The court pointed out that the
officer in stopping Mimms could point to no observable facts
that would indicate criminal activity. In fact, the officer testified
that there was nothing unusual or suspicious about Mimms's behavior. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sought review of
the state supreme court decision, and the United States
20
Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari.
The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The Mimms Court held that a police officer who lawfully stops a motor vehicle for the purpose of issuing a traffic
summons does not violate the fourth amendment's proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures when he orders the
driver out of the vehicle, notwithstanding that the Officer had no
reason to suspect that he was in danger.
In reversing the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Court
in Mimms relied on its decision in Terry, in which the Court
held that the intrusion upon an individual's right to privacy was
justified on the grounds that the particular facts and circumstances present would indicate to a reasonable man that "criminal activity may be afoot. '2 1 Although the Court relied on Terry,
it failed to view the particular facts in Mimms in relation to the
19. 471 Pa. 546, 370 A.2d 1157 (1977).
20. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).

21. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
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further intrusion imposed when the officer ordered Mimms out
of the vehicle. Instead, the Supreme Court relied solely on a
balancing test.22 In applying this test the Court emphasized its
concern for police safety by holding that the risk an officer encounters when approaching a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation clearly outweighs the small intrusion upon the individual's
privacy. By justifying this additional intrusion, the Court
clearly departed from the reasoning used in its prior holdings.
By examining the previous holdings, the proper background will
be established against which Mimms should be analyzed in order to demonstrate its legal significance.
Prior Precedent
The specific requirement that probable cause be shown
before the issuance of a warrant was a safeguard included in the
Constitution. This restriction was embodied in the Constitution
to insure that the decision of when the right of privacy must
yield to a search would be placed in the hands of a judicial officer and not a peace officer. 23 Warrantless searches have been
upheld where consent of the party has been obtained,2 4 or
where exingent circumstances are present.25 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has created a limited number of specifically established judicial exceptions which recognize warrantless
searches. 26 However, both warrant and warrantless searches
conducted under the fourth amendment are measured against
27
the standard of reasonableness.
The drafters of the fourth amendment could not have foreseen the necessity of swift police action that is called for in today's society. To investigate individuals who appear suspicious,
although probable cause is lacking, the police have commonly
22. 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).

23. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1932).
24. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
25. See Warren v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
26. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (a full body search
may be conducted incident to a custodial traffic arrest); Cupp v. Murphy,
412 U.S. 291 (1973) (warrantless search may be held where evidence is of a
highly evanescent nature); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (only
the area within the arrestee's control may be searched); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) (a pat-down search may be conducted when an officer believes
suspect is armed and dangerous and involved in criminal activity); Angello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (search incident to valid arrest required
no warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (a warrantless

search may be conducted of an automobile if there is probable cause that it
is being used for a felony).
27. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 766 (1966); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 (1965).

212

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:207

resorted to the practice known as stop and frisk. 28 Prior to the
Terry decision, there was controversy over the validity of this
police practice. 29 Proponents of stop and frisk viewed this procedure as merely investigative and hence not within fourth
amendment safeguards.30 Others argued that the stop and frisk
procedure should be measured by the probable cause requirethought that
ment of the fourth amendment, 31 and still others
32
the reasonableness requirement should apply.
The Supreme Court answered this question in Terry
wherein the Court established a new exception to the warrant
requirement. The Supreme Court recognized for the first time
that a stop and frisk came within the confines of the fourth
amendment 33 and held that a frisk without a warrant is constitutional if performed within certain limitations. In delineating the
permissible scope of a stop and frisk procedure, the Terry Court
adopted a reasonableness test. 34 Chief Justice Warren, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that to ascertain the reasonableness of an officer's conduct the Court must balance the
intrusion into the individual's privacy with the need for the
search.3 5 Justification for the intrusion into an individual's privacy would be adjudged according to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.3 6 In evaluating the police
conduct in relation to the circumstances, the Court adopted an
objective standard: "Would the facts available to the officer at
the moment of the seizure or search, warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropri37
ate?"
The significance of the Terry decision is the emphasis the
Court put on deciding stop and frisk cases according to the particular facts in each case. The court stated that when an officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that
"criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous" he is entitled to conduct a limited pat-down search for his own or an28. See note 3 supra.
29. 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
30. See Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J.
CRIM. L. 393, 406 (1963).
31. Brief for Respondent at 21, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
32. Brief for National District Attorney's Association as amicus curiae

at 25, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
33. See note 4 supra.
34. 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. at 21-22.
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other's safety.38
On the same day as Terry, the Supreme Court decided two
other warrantless search cases. In Peters v. New York 39 an officer pursued and stopped two men he suspected of being burglars. After receiving an unsatisfactory response from them, the
officer frisked the men and felt a hard object on one of the two
men which turned out to be burglary tools. The Peters Court
upheld the frisk since there was probable cause to arrest. In
Sibron v. New York, 4° however, the Court held there was no
probable cause to arrest the defendant where the officer merely
observed the defendant talk with six to eight known narcotics
addicts in an eight-hour period. The Court looked to the specific
facts of the case to see if the officers could infer that the defendant was armed and dangerous. Finding no facts in the record to
indicate that the defendant was dangerous, the Sibron Court
held that the search was not confined to the purpose of finding
deadly weapons and therefore the search was unlawful.
A further extension concerning the legality of a stop and
41
frisk was upheld by the Supreme Court in Adams v. Williams.
The Adams Court held that a police officer who conducts a stop
and frisk based on an informant's tip that an occupant of an automobile possessed drugs and a weapon did not violate the
fourth amendment. An unverified informant's tip was a sufficient basis for an officer's "reasonable" belief that the citizen is
armed and dangerous, if the tip is supported by a sufficient "indicia of reliability. '42 The Court cited three factors to measure
the indicia of reliability: first, the informant must be known to
the officer; second, the informant must have provided the officer
with information in the past; and third, the informant must personally give the information that is immediately verifiable at the
scene. 43 Thus the standard set forth in Terry, that the reasona38. Id. at 30.
39. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). A frisk by a police officer was upheld when the
officer heard noises at his apartment door and saw two strangers tiptoeing
away. He pursued the men suspecting them to be burglars. Upon questioning them, he frisked one man and found burglary tools. The Court held that

the search was lawful since the officer had probable cause to arrest.
40. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). An officer had observed the defendant for eight
hours and saw him converse with at least six known narcotics addicts.
Later the officer approached the defendant and said "you know what I'm
after." The defendant reached into his pocket at which time the officer did
the same and found heroin packets. The Court held that the search was
unreasonable since it was not confined to a protective search for weapons.
41. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). A stop and frisk was upheld where officer acting
on an informant's tip that occupant of a car was armed and dangerous and
possessed drugs thrust his hand in car window and recovered a weapon,
and later found drugs on the occupant.
42. Id. at 147.
43. Id. at 146-47.
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bleness of a search depends upon the officer's personal observations, was expanded by the Court in Adams to include an
unverified informant's tip.
The most recent cases prior to Mimms that involved the authority of the police in the area of search and seizure were
United States v. Robinson" and the companion case of Gustafson v. Florida.45 In these two cases a full body search was conducted by a police officer after a custodial arrest for a traffic
violation. The Court in Robinson held that "in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement ... but is also a 'reasonable'
search .... 46 These opinions are significant because previ-

ously the Court had limited a search incident to an arrest to the
area immediately within the arrestee's control. 47 This limitation
had been justified on the grounds that there was a need first, to
disarm the criminal for the protection of the officer, and second,
to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime. 48
The decisions in Robinson and Gustafson reject the traditional narrow and limited exceptions to the warrant requirement and indicate a refusal by the Court to be restrained by the
limitations set down in Terry for a stop and frisk. Although deciding that an arrest by a police officer gives him the authority to
conduct a full search of the arrestee, the remaining question left
unanswered is whether this authority could extend to police officers in a situation where the officer does not intend to make an
arrest and does not fear for his own safety. This question was
44. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). A police officer stopped Robinson for driving his
automobile without a valid driver's permit. The officer placed defendant

under arrest and frisked him; the officer reached into Robinson's coat pocket and found a crumpled cigarette package, the officer looked inside and
found heroin capsules. The Court held that a full search incidental to a custodial arrest was lawful.

45. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). The police stopped Gustafson for weaving across
the median strip. Gustafson could not produce a valid driver's license and
was arrested and taken into custody. The officer conducted a full body
search and upon opening a cigarette package found marijuana cigarettes.
Again, the Court validated the search since it was incidental to an arrest.
46. 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
47. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Police officers arrested
Chimel at his home in connection with a burglary of a coin shop. After the
arrest, the officers conducted a warrantless search of Chimel's house over
his protests. The Court held that a search, which is incident to an arrest, is
limited to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. The Court
defined the area within the arrestee's control as that to which the arrestee
might reach for a weapon or evidence of crime.
48. See, e.g., Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The Court approved a warrantless search to find evidence connected with the crime, as

well as weapons. See also Note, Scope Limitationsfor Searches Incident to
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 434 n.12 (1969).
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49
posed before the Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms.

ANALYSIS

Mootness and the Grant of Certiorari
Respondent Mimms opposed the grant of certiorari in this
case. Mimms contended that there was no justiciable controversy since Mimms had already completed the three year maximum sentence imposed upon him.50 Therefore, respondent
concluded that the case was moot.5 1 The respondent cited St.
Pierre v. United States52 as authority for the proposition that a
federal court is without power to decide moot questions. The
Court in Mimms, however, noted that the rule set down in St.
53
Pierre was no longer applicable.
After dismissing St. Pierre as authority, the Mimms Court
referred to more recent cases that have allowed judicial review
where there is a possibility that the defendant will suffer "collateral legal consequences" '5 4 despite the fact that the question is
moot. Although these cases which allowed review involved the
collateral effects on the defendant, the Court pointed out that
the ability of a state to impose a sentence may have collateral
effects upon the state itself. 55 Thus the Court in Mimms held
the state was entitled to review and granted certiorari. After
56
granting certiorari, the Mimms Court, in a per curiam opinion,
summarily reversed the judgment of Pennsylvania's highest
court.
A summary reversal eliminates the need for oral arguments,
57
and the decision rests solely on the basis of certiorari papers.
49. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
50. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
2, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108 n.3 (1977).
51. Id.

52. 319 U.S. 41 (1943). The Court held that service of sentence for con-

tempt of court renders the case moot and case was therefore not reviewable.
53. 434 U.S. at 108 n.3.
54. Id. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Carafas v.
LaValle 391 U.S. 234 (1968).

55. Id.
56. A per curiam opinion is a decision concurred in by the majority of
the Court but does not disclose the author. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1244

(rev. 4th ed. 1968). It is interesting to note that an important fourth amendment decision was delivered by the Court in this manner. One cannot help
but question why a Justice would decline to author this opinion.
57. The Court takes such summary action when a majority of the Court
feel that the decision below is so clearly erroneous that oral argument
would be a waste of time. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE §§ 5-12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as STERN & GRESSMAN]. Justice
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In this type of disposition the respondent is at a great disadvantage. A brief in opposition to the writ is usually addressed to the
question of why certiorari should not be granted; it does not focus on the merits of the case. If the merits are discussed, the
treatment is brief and superficial. Since summary reversal does
away with oral arguments, the respondent is deprived of the opportunity to argue to a greater extent the merits. 58 Mimms's
brief in opposition to the writ is a good example. The brief is
short in length and the substantive content of it is directed at
59
why the Court should not grant certiorari.
Both Justices Marshall and Stevens in their dissents state
their discontent with the procedural aspects of the case besides
disagreeing with the majority on the merits. 60 Justice Marshall
asserts that this type of summary action by the Court involving
such an important issue will not increase respect for the Court's
work.6 1 Justice Stevens points out that the Court decided Terry
only after six months of deliberations, oral arguments, and extensive briefing. 62 He states that it is disturbing that the Court
decided Mimms "almost casually." Finally, Justice Stevens
mentions that full argument might have persuaded him to accept the majority's position that the interest in police safety required an extension of the Terry standard. 63 After quickly
disposing of the procedural aspects, the majority directed their
attention to the merits of the case.
The Court's Decision on the Merits
The Supreme Court began its analysis by narrowing the issue before the Court. The Court noted that its focus was on the
intrusion on a citizen's right to privacy when requested by the
police officer to get out of his vehicle once the vehicle was lawBrennan has emphasized that this practice should rarely be used in reviewing state court cases. The ordinary practice of the Court is not to reverse a
state court decision without oral argument. See Brennan, State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PA. BAR ASS'N Q. 393, 403 (1960).
58. See Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term Foreward: Process of
Law, 72 HARV. L. REv. 77, 79, 80, 82 (1958); See also STERN & GRESSMAN,
supra note 57 at 187.

59. Respondent's brief in opposition to the writ was nine pages in
length. Three out of the four questions presented dealt with why certiorari
should not be granted. The fourth issue discussed by the respondent concerned the merits. However, this discussion is brief in comparison to the 19
page brief submitted by the petitioner along with another seven page reply
memorandum.
60. 434 U.S. 106, 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 115 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 114.
62. Id. at 115.

63. Id. at 123 n.13.
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fully stopped. 64 The initial intrusion resulting from the stop or
65
pat-down was not in question.
In reversing the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
that the search violated the fourth amendment, the Mimms
Court set forth two basic guidelines for analysis under the
fourth amendment. First, it would determine if the police officer's action intruded upon a citizen's privacy by "the reasonableness in all the circumstances.1 66 Second, in determining the
reasonableness of the search, the Court would have to balance
67
the intrusion into a citizen's privacy with the public interest.
Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, the justification for further
intruding upon a citizen's right of privacy would be balanced
against the need for added security for law enforcement officials.
Reasonableness Test Abandoned
At the outset, the Mimms Court stated that the "touchstone" of its analysis under the fourth amendment is to consider
the reasonableness of the intrusion in light of the surrounding
circumstances. 68 The Court relied on its decision in Terry as the
basis for determining reasonableness when confronted with a
fourth amendment issue.69 In Terry the Court specifically noted
70
that certain facts alone do not give rise to anything suspicious.
The Court in Terry, however, pointed out that the officer did
have reason to investigate the defendants' behavior, because he
had thirty years of experience in the neighborhood where he observed the defendants "case out" a particular store more than
twenty-four times. 7 1 Therefore, the specific circumstances in
Terry justified the officer's actions.
Although recognizing the need of evaluating each intrusion
into a citizen's privacy by examining the particular facts in each
case, the Court failed to apply this test in Mimms. 72 The unique64. Id. at 109.

65. Id. at 111-12. The standard enunciated in Terry was whether the
facts would indicate to a reasonable man that a frisk is necessary. Once the
bulge in Mimms's jacket was noticed by the officer, the officer was justified

in conducting the search.
66. Id. at 109.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 108-09.
69. Id. at 109.
70. 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
71. Id. at 23.
72. 434 U.S. at 116. Justice Stevens, in his dissent stated: "More important, it appears to abandon 'the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence'-which has ordinarily required individualized
inquiry into the particular facts justifying every police intrusion-in favor of
a general rule covering countless situations."
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ness of the situation presented in Mimms should have signaled
to the Court the need to apply the reasonableness test relied
upon in Terry. In Mimms the officer stopped the vehicle because the license plates had expired and proceeded to issue a
summons for violating the traffic code. There were no exigent
circumstances to alert the officer that the driver was dangerous
or involved in criminal activity; nor did the officer stop Mimms
with the intent to arrest him as in Robinson.
Both in the lower courts and in the Supreme Court, Pennsylvania conceded that there was nothing unusual or suspicious
about Mimms's behavior nor did the officer have any reason to
73
fear for his own safety as was the case in Terry. When the state
acknowledged that the officer's action was not based on the fear
that the driver was dangerous or involved in criminal activity, it
failed to legitimize the need for the police officer's intrusion. A
brief survey of relevant case law has established that the justification for an intrusion is dependent on the particular circumstances. 74 By not applying the reasonableness test of Terry, the
Mimms Court departed from its prior holdings. The Supreme
Court did note the concession by the state, but the Court did not
inquire into whether the order to step out of the car was related
to the initial stop. Instead, the Court in Mimms resorted to a
75
balancing test.
The Balancing Test
In determining whether a governmental intrusion upon a
citizen's right to privacy is justified, the police action must be
balanced against the citizen's interest to remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The fourth amendment does
not contain a specific formula for determining reasonableness.
In Camara v. Municipal Court,76 however, the Court initiated a
73. Id. at 109.
74. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (where the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a pat-down frisk when the circumstances indicated that
criminal activity was afoot and defendant might be armed and dangerous);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Court upheld the validity of a
warrantless search due to the fact that police were in hot pursuit of an
armed felon); Gobart v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (prohibition
agents, acting under color of an invalid arrest warrant and falsely claiming a
search warrant, entered company's office, arrested two employees, and
made a general search; the Court held there was no formula to determine
reasonableness, but each case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances).

75. 434 U.S. at 109-11.
76. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara was charged with violating a San Francisco Housing Code for refusing to allow a warrantless inspection of the
ground floor quarters. Camara claimed the inspection ordinance was un-

constitutional for failure to require a warrant. The Court held that in non-
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balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a search by a
housing inspector. After Camara, the Court has continued to
use a balancing test when analyzing the constitutionality of
77
searches.
The Mimms Court relied solely on a balancing test to justify
the police officer's actions. As precedent, the Court cited United
States v. Brignoni Ponce7 8 where a balancing test was employed
to determine the constitutionality of border searches of
automobiles. Relying on Brignoni Ponce, the Court in its analysis first examined the officer's interest in ordering Mimms out
of the car. Ordering a motorist out of his car was the normal
practice of the police officer. The state argued that this practice
is legitimate because it provides additional protection to the police.79 This contention was not questioned since the Court in
Mimms reasoned that a face-to-face confrontation would lessen
the opportunity for an assault upon the officer.
In Terry, however, almost the opposite rationale was used
by the Court to justify a frisk. The Terry Court reasoned that
because of the frequent face-to-face encounters between citizens and law enforcement officials, an officer is justified in conducting a frisk only when there is "criminal activity afoot" and
the officer fears for his safety. 80 Justice Stevens, in his dissent
in Mimms, pointed out that the majority does not support the
assumption that an officer's safety is enhanced by a face-to-face
confrontation. In fact, certain experts of human behavior have
emergency situations, as was present here, a warrant should be obtained.
However, the Court stated that to determine if a search is reasonable they
must weigh the governmental interest against the individual's right to privacy.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975);

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 1415 (1948).
78. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The U.S. Government's Border Patrol stopped a
vehicle near the Mexican border, and questioned the occupants about their
immigration status and citizenship. The only reason for stopping the vehicle was because the occupants appeared to be of Mexican descent. The
Court held that the stop was unreasonable under the fourth amendment. In
determining that the stop violated the fourth amendment, the Court applied
the balancing test established in Camara.

79. 434 U.S. at 110.
80. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court in Terry repeatedly emphasized that
their holding was a narrow one, contingent on the circumstances. The

Court stated:
When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and dangerous to the officer or to others it would appear to be clearly unreasonable
to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the
threat of physical harm.

Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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81
explicitly advised against this type of confrontation.

In further examining the officers interest, the Court relied
heavily on dicta in Terry. The Mimms Court cited Terry for the
statement that police officers need not take unnecessary risks in
the performance of their jobs.82 The Court concluded that an
officer's safety "is both legitimate and weighty. '83 Although the
Terry Court recognized that unnecessary risks need not be
taken by law enforcement officials, the Court was concerned
with the specific facts in Terry. Those facts can easily be distinguished from the facts in Mimms. In Terry, the officer who performed the frisk had knowledge from personal observation to
believe that the person with whom he was dealing was armed
and dangerous. The officer in Terry had watched the two men
walk past the store window and peer in twenty-four times. The
officer in Mimms, however, freely admitted that he neither observed any unusual circumstances nor suspected Mimms to be
dangerous.
In upholding the frisk in Terry, the Court concluded that
outlawing the frisk where an officer with thirty years experience
suspects three men to be "casing" a store would have exposed
officers to unnecessary risks in their day-to-day street encounters. In comparison, the officer in Mimms conceded that
the only reason he asked the driver to step out of his car was
because it was his practice to do so. 84 Furthermore, the officer
admitted that he was not fearful for his safety.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens points out that the danger as85
sociated with law enforcement can never be totally eliminated.
Surely, approaching an individual whom an officer suspects to
be dangerous is a more serious confrontation than the common
occurrance of approaching a citizen to issue a traffic summons.
No one would deny that an officer needs to eliminate as many
risks as possible when confronting a suspected criminal. However, the Court in Mimms fails to make this distinction. The
81. 434 U.S. at 119. Justice Stevens in discussing the validity of the police study used by the majority stated:
IT]hey lend no support to the Court's assumption that ordering the
routine traffic offender out of his car significantly enhances the officer's
safety. Arguably, such an order could actually aggravate the officer's
danger because the fear of a search might cause a serious offender to

take desperate action that would be unnecessary if he remained in the
vehicle while being ticketed.
82. Id. at 110. The majority quoted Terry: "Certainly it would be unrea-

sonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. [392 U.S. at 231."

83. 434 U.S. at 110.
84. Id. at 109-10.
85. Id. at 120.

19781

Pennsylvania v. Mimms

Court equates the average traffic violator with the suspected
dangerous criminal. The Court in Mimms supports its reasoning
on the need to provide law enforcment officials with added protection in all confrontations between the law and citizens.
In re-emphasizing the risks that are attendant with a police
officer's job, the Court relied on a police study that had been
cited in Adams v. Williams.8 6 According to the statistics of this
study, approximately 30% of assaults on police officers occurred
when an officer approached a suspect in an automobile.8 7 However, both the dissents in Robinson88 and Mimms 89 questioned
the majority's reliance on this particular study. The Supreme
Court was cognizant of the fact that the study did not indicate
whether the assaults had occurred during the issuance of a traffic summons. Nevertheless, the Court stated that they would
not accept the argument that less danger was involved when a
police officer stops a citizen for a traffic violation. 90 The Court
turned to Robinson where it acknowledged that a significant
number of police officers are murdered when making traffic
stops. 9 1 The simple fact that the Supreme Court relied on a statistical study, which was not precisely on point, illustrated its
profound concern for police safety and lack of concern for individual rights.
The Court in Mimms strengthened the officer's interest by
stating that an officer who stands on the driver's side of the vehicle exposes himself to passing traffic and accidental injury. The
Court suggested that both the safety of the officer and the driver
86. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
87. Id. See Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54
J. CRIM. L. 93 (1963).

88. 414 U.S. at 255, wherein Mr. Justice Marshall in his dissent stated:

The majority relies on statistics indicating that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops. But these statistics only confirm what we recognized
in Terry-that "American criminals have a long tradition of armed vio-

lence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are
killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded."
89. 434 U.S. at 118. Justice Stevens in his dissent emphatically points

out that the majority is basing its conclusion that police officers encounter
danger when they stop citizens for a minor traffic violation on one statement from a police study. Further, he points out that the study does not
establish what the risks are that are specifically associated with traffic
stops.
90. Id. at 110.
91. The dissent not only noted that the police study relied on by the
majority was not on point, but expressed added concern that there was no
opportunity for full argument in Mimms. Justice Stevens points out that in

Terry there was six months of deliberation, full argument and unusually
elaborate briefing. Furthermore, Justice Stevens notes that full argument
on the need for additional police safety might convince him that the majority of the Court was correct. See 434 U.S. at 115-23.
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would be enhanced if the inquiry was held with both individuals

standing on the shoulder of the road. 92 After examining the interests of the officer, the Mimms Court in applying its balancing
test had to consider next the citizen's interest to be free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.
De Minimus Intrusion
In one paragraph, the Court dismissed the intrusion into the
driver's personal liberty as "de minimus. '93 The Court reached
this conclusion on the fact that the driver had already been lawfully detained, and the only question remaining was whether
the driver would be detained in his car or outside of it. The
Supreme Court reasoned that Mimms was exposing "very little
more of his person" 94 than he exposed from initially being
stopped by the officer. The Court described the further request
of the officer as a "mere inconvenience" 95 and held that when
balanced against the officer's safety, the individual's interest
could not prevail.
In its analysis of the citizen's expectation to privacy, the
Court suggests that the initial lawful stop was the significant intrusion into the individual's privacy. 96 The further intrusion of

getting out of one's car is incidental to the original stop and
hence, is de minimus. The Court compares the officer's request
in Mimms to the "pat-down" in Terry and concludes that it was
neither a serious intrusion upon the individual's sanctity nor did
97
it rise to the level of a "petty indignity."
The majority opinion in Mimms begs the question of
whether an initial intrusion on a citizen's right to privacy allows
the officer to make further intrusions. This question, however,
has already been answered by the Supreme Court in Chimel v.
California.98 The Court in Chimel expressly dismisses the idea
that once a police officer makes an initial intrusion upon a citizen's right to privacy, any accompanying search is inconsequential. The Chimel Court states that "[w] e can see no reason why,
simply because some interference with an individual's privacy
and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the ,absence of
92. Id. at 111.
93. Taken from the latin term de minimis non curat lex meaning the law
does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trivial matters. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY

94.
95.
96.
97.

482 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

434 U.S. at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id.

98. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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a warrant that the fourth amendment would otherwise require." 99 Thus the decision in Mimms implicitly overrules the
holding in Chimel. Furthermore, it now appears that the Court
will sanction further intrusions upon a driver's personal liberty
once he has been lawfully detained by a police officer for the
purpose of issuing a traffic violation.
THE IMPACT OF MIMMS

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed Mimms's conviction on a ground unrelated to the search issue. 10 0 The state court instead rested its
decision on state law.10 ' This decision, however, should not be
considered surprising. To the contrary, the Pennsylvania court
has followed the example of an increasing number of state
courts who have relied on state constitutions or state laws in or10 2
der to afford increased protection to the criminally accused.
This trend of state courts relying upon state law in protecting the individualized liberties of the criminally accused began
after the Court's decisions in Robinson and Gustafson. Shortly
99. Id. at 766.
100. The court reversed Mimms's conviction during the last week of
March, 1978. The basis for the reversal was a potentially prejudicial statement that was made during the trial. The prosecutor questioned a defense
witness about Mimms's religious affiliation, a matter not raised in direct examination of the witness. Commonwealth v. Mimms, 477 Pa. 553, 385 A.2d
334 (1978).
101. The Pennsylvania legislature has provided in the Act of April 23,
1909, P.L. 140, § 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 313 that "no witness shall be questioned, in any judicial proceeding concerning his religious beliefs; nor shall
any evidence be heard on the subject, for the purpose of affecting either his
competency or credibility."
102. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1975) (officers conducted full search incident to an arrest as was sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Robinson. The state court held that under
the state constitution only a search for weapons would be reasonable);State
v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974) (state court rejected Robinson
and held a search incident to an arrest is limited to one for weapons or
fruits of the crime under the state constitution); People v. Beaveis, 393
Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975) (state court held that warrantless eavesdropping by an electronic transmitter violated state constitution, however,

the Supreme Court held there was no violation of the fourth amendment in
a similar situation in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (The Supreme Court allowed use of constitutionally infirm statements to impeach the credibility of
a defendant's trial testimony. On remand the state court held the use of the
statement was prohibited by the state constitution);State v. Opperman, 247
N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (Supreme Court held an inventory procedure by police not violative of the fourth amendment. On remand, the state court held
that the procedure was unreasonable under state constitution). See also

Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in
the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976).
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after these two decisions, the state courts of Hawaii 10 3 and California 10 4 held that the Court's decision in Robinson was unpersuasive, and limited the search after an arrest to one for
weapons or for fruits or implements of the crime. These state
courts based their decisions on the search and seizure provisions of their state constitutions. There have been countless
other decisions where state courts have declined to follow the
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court. 10 5 Apparently
state courts have even anticipated contrary rulings by the Court
and accordingly, have rested their decisions solely upon state
10 6
grounds in order to avoid reversal.
The dissenting opinions in Mimms note that the Court's decision could easily be eluded by the Pennsylvania court if the
state court on remand based its decision on adequate state
grounds. 10 7 Consequently, the final decision by the Court in
Mimms should have little impact on the national level. However, the pattern of state courts relying upon state law to
broaden the rights of the criminally accused can be expected to
continue.
The significance of state courts basing their judgments upon
state rather than federal law cannot be denied. This approach
indicates a deliberate attempt by state courts to circumvent the
holdings of recent Supreme Court decisions that have restricted
the rights of accused persons. This view is illustrated by the
Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Kaluna wherein the court
states:
While this results in a divergence of meaning between words which
are the same in both the federal and state constitutions, the system
of federalism envisaged by the United States Constitution tolerates
such divergence where the result is greater protection of individual
rights under state law than under federal law .... 108
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are to be
accorded respect and great consideration. Still, these decisions
only establish the minimum standards that the states are required to observe in the criminal process. State courts are free
to expand these standards, and recent decisions demonstrate a
103. State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974).
104. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975).
105. See note 102 supra.

106. Burrows v. Superior Ct., 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1974) (The state court held that under state law bank depositors have a
privacy interest in their bank records to invalidate disclosure by the bank to
the police. The Supreme Court held the contrary in United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
107. 434 U.S. 106, 114-15, 116-17 (1977).

108. 55 Hawaii 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974).
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willingness on the part of the state courts to do so, even in lieu
of a Supreme Court decision holding otherwise. The state
courts have undertaken the role of determining the outside
boundaries of constitutional protections afforded accused persons, rather than following the minimal standards imposed
upon them by the federal courts.
With respect to the scope of the holding in Mimms in Jones
v. United States'0 9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently rejected the Government's argument that a police officer is justified in ordering all occupants out of a car
although the initial stop was not based on the standards set
forth in Terry. The government contended that under the holding in Mimms, a police officer, once he had occasion to speak
with the occupants of a car, could order them out of the vehicle
for his own protection. Jones presented the court with no facts
or circumstances' 10 which would indicate that "criminal activity
was afoot." Absent such facts that would warrant the initial intrusion, the government's reliance on Mimms was adjudged illfounded.
The appellate court held that Mimms did not support the
government's position. The Jones Court distinguished Mimms
on the facts presented in the instant case and concluded that
Mimms in no way sanctions such action by a police officer."' In
fact, the court in Jones noted that the Supreme Court had
specifically stated that their decision in Mimms does not allow a
police officer to order occupants out of their cars on every occasion in which he may have a reason to speak to them. 1 2 Reversing the lower court and refusing to expand the Mimms doctrine,
the Jones Court summarized its decision in stating that "[t]o
hold otherwise would allow the government to bootstrap its way
to a full blown seizure in the absence of articuable facts indicating that criminal activity is afoot. ....,,113
109. Jones v. United States, 24 CRIM.L. REP. (BNA) 2026 (D.C. Cir. Sept.

18, 1978).

110. In Jones, a police officer working the night shift in an area with a

recent incidence of crime came across the defendant and a passenger sitting in a car with the dome light on. The car was parked in the rear of a

building and the passenger was smoking a cigarette. As the officer approached the vehicle the passenger made a quick movement as though he
was hiding something. The officer believed it to be "some type of weapon"
and ordered the occupants out of the car. Shortly thereafter the officer noticed some green weed and pinkish pills. The defendant was convicted of

possession of marijuana after his motion to suppress was denied. Id.
111. Id. at 2027.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Mimms decision signifies the Supreme Court's continued concern for police safety and lack of concern for individual
rights. The fourth amendment guarantees to' citizens the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 114 However, the
Court's failure in Mimms to determine the reasonableness of a
search or seizure by examining the particular circumstances deprives individuals of the basic safeguard embodied in the fourth
amendment. A police officer is no longer required to explain his
actions, rather he has the discretion to decide whether or not an
individual's right to be left alone will be intruded upon. The possibility for abuse in this area can be endless. As Justice Stevens
so carefully points out in his dissent, "[s]ome citizens will be
subjected to this minor indignity while other-perhaps those
stickers, or differwith more expensive cars, or different bumper
115
entirely."
it
escape
ent colored skin-may
While the Supreme Court continues to diminish the rights
of the accused, the state courts have begun to afford increased
protection to these individuals. The decision by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania on remand reaffirms the trend of state
courts to base their decisions on state law so that they are virtually immune from Supreme Court review.
Furthermore, at least one court has viewed the Mimms decision narrowly." x6 The court refused to expand Mimms by allowing a police officer to order occupants from a vehicle
whenever he has occasion to speak with them. In light of recent
Supreme Court decisions eroding the protection of fourth
amendment safeguards, one can only hope that the state courts
will continue to look to their state constitutions to provide citizens with the basic rights the fourth amendment was established to protect.
Christine A. Campbell

114. See note 1 supra.

115. 434 U.S. 106, 122 (1977).
116. Jones v. United States, 24 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2026 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
18, 1978). But see Rakus v. Illinois, 47 U.S.L.W. 4095 (Dec. 5, 1978). Where
the Supreme Court seems to have further eroded fourth amendment safe-

guards. In this case the Court held that the defendants did not have the
right to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule where they were

merely passengers in a car. Thus, the exclusionary rule may now be invoked only where the defendants have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the invaded place.

